

Hardware implementation of ECC

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Introduction

- Public-key Cryptography (PKC)
 - The most famous PKC is RSA and ECC
 - Used for key agreement (Diffie-Hellman), digital signatures, public-key encryption
- Implementation of public-key cryptosystem
 - Slower encryption/decryption (~Mbps) than symmetric key cryptography (AES: ~Gbps)
 - RSA: modular exponentiation, $c^d \bmod n$
 - ECC: point multiplication, kP on elliptic curve
 - Expensive!!


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Point operations on elliptic curve

- Point Addition
 $R = P + Q$
- Point Doubling
 $R' = 2P'$
Tangent line
- Scalar Multiplication
 kP
Binary algorithm




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Basic hierarchy for ECC

- Optimization is possible in multi-layer



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Series of modular operations



Type of Curve?

GF(p), GF(2^m)?

Security Level?

Coordinate?

SW/HW?

FPGA/ASIC

Technology?

Size, Latency, Power?

(AB + C) mod p

Require: $P = (X_1, Y_1, Z_1)$, $Q = (X_2, Y_2, Z_2)$. Ensure: $Q = Q + P$.	Require: $P = (X_1, Y_1, 1)$, $Q = (X_2, Y_2, Z_2)$. Ensure: $Q = Q + P$.	Require: $Q = (X_2, Y_2, Z_2)$. Ensure: $Q = 2Q$.
1: $t_1 = Z_1 Z_1$;	1: $t_3 = Z_2 Z_2$;	1: $t_1 = X_2 X_2$;
2: $t_2 = X_2 t_1$;	2: $t_4 = X_1 t_3 + X_2$;	2: $t_1 = 3t_1$;
3: $t_3 = Z_2 Z_2$;	3: $t_2 = X_1 t_3 - X_2$;	3: $t_2 = Z_2 Z_2$;
4: $t_4 = X_1 t_3 + t_2$;	4: $t_1 = t_3 Z_2$;	4: $t_2 = t_2 t_2$;
5: $t_2 = X_1 t_3 - t_2$;	5: $t_3 = t_1 Y_1 + Y_2$;	5: $t_2 = at_2 + t_1$;
6: $t_3 = t_1 Z_1$;	6: $Y_2 = t_1 Y_1 - Y_2$;	6: $t_1 = 2t_1$;
7: $t_4 = Y_2 t_3$;	7: $t_3 = t_2 t_2$;	7: $Z_2 = Z_2 t_1$;
8: $t_1 = t_3 Z_2$;	8: $t_1 = t_4 t_3$;	8: $t_3 = t_1 t_1$;
9: $t_3 = t_1 Y_1 + Y_2$;	9: $X_2 = Y_2 Y_2 - t_1$;	9: $t_4 = X_2 t_3$;
10: $Y_2 = t_1 Y_1 - Y_2$;	10: $t_4 = -2X_2 + t_1$;	10: $X_2 = 2t_4$;
11: $t_2 = t_2 t_2$;	11: $t_1 = t_5 t_3$;	11: $X_2 = t_2 t_2 - X_2$;
12: $t_1 = t_4 t_3$;	12: $t_1 = t_2 t_1$;	12: $t_1 = t_1 t_3$;
13: $X_2 = Y_2 Y_2 - t_1$;	13: $t_3 = t_4 Y_2 - t_1$;	13: $t_1 = t_1 Y_2$;
14: $t_4 = -2X_2 + t_1$;	14: $Y_2 = t_3/2$;	14: $t_3 = t_4 - X_2$;
15: $t_1 = t_5 t_3$;	15: $Z_2 = t_2 Z_2$;	15: $Y_2 = t_2 t_3 - t_1$;
16: $t_1 = t_3 t_1$;	16: Return Q ;	16: Return Q ;
17: $t_3 = t_4 Y_2 - t_1$;		
18: $Y_2 = t_3/2$;		
19: $Z_2 = t_2 Z_2$;		
20: $Z_1 = Z_1 Z_2$;		
21: Return Q ;		

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
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Data Size in Modular Operations



- Modular multiplication



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
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of Modular Multiplications



- RSA: c^d , ECC: kP



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
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Total computational complexity



ECC: 256 bits



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Right-to-left & Left-to-right



Left-to-right Binary Algorithm

Input: non-negative integers $c, d = (d_{t-1}d_{t-2} \dots d_1d_0)_2$.

Output: $c^d \bmod n$.

```

1:  $T \leftarrow 1$ 
2: for  $i$  from  $t-1$  down to 0 do
3:    $T \leftarrow T^2 \bmod n$ 
4:   if  $d_i = 1$  then
5:      $T \leftarrow cT \bmod n$ 
6:   end if
7: end for
8: Return  $T$ 
    
```

Dependency

Right-to-left Binary Algorithm

Input: non-negative integers $c, d = (d_{t-1}d_{t-2} \dots d_1d_0)_2$.

Output: $c^d \bmod n$.

```

1:  $S \leftarrow 1, T \leftarrow c$ 
2: for  $i$  from 0 to  $t-1$  do
3:   if  $d_i = 1$  then
4:      $S \leftarrow ST \bmod n$ 
5:   end if
6:    $T \leftarrow T^2 \bmod n$ 
7: end for
8: Return  $S$ 
    
```

No Dependency

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
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
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RSA: parallelism for high speed



- CRT
- Binary algorithm

2048b RSA =  Parallelism in Square and Multiply (2048MM) x 2

=  Parallelism in CRT Square and Multiply (1024MM) x 4

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
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
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ECC: parallelism for high speed



- Point operations



256b ECC = 

ECC Scalar Multiplication

(256MM) x ??

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Exercise I



- Q: Latency of 2048b CRT-RSA?
 - Latency of 1024b MM = 100ns
- A1: $100\text{ns} \times 1024 \times 1.5 \times 2 = 300\mu\text{s}$
 - when using one MM
- A2: $100\text{ns} \times 1024 \times 1.5 = 150\mu\text{s}$
 - when using two MMs
- Squaring = MM

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Exercise 2


- Q: Latency of 256b ECC?
 - Latency of 256b MM = 5ns
 - Point addition needs 12 MM
 - Point doubling needs 10 MM
- A1: $5\text{ns} \times 256 \times 16 = 160\mu\text{s}$
 - when using one MM
- A2: $160/2 = 80\mu\text{s}$
 - when using two MM's & **deg. parallelism = 2**

Faster implementation

- Latency of 256 ECC can be less than 1 μs ?
 - Short latency of 256b MM : e.g. **4x**
 - More parallelism : e.g. **4x**
 - Efficient point operation sequence : e.g. **4x**
- Limitation of
 - current CMOS technology
 - current PKC

Yet Another Bottleneck

- Data coherence
 - Memory (register) access
 - SRAM
 - 1W2R register
- Scheduling
 - Dynamic/Static



Modular Multiplication

- Multiplication + Reduction
 - Barrett Reduction (1986): Focus on MSBs
 - Montgomery Reduction (1985): Focus on LSBs
- Based on n-bit multiplier ($n = 8, 16, 32, 64$)
 - E.g., CIOS [Koç, Acar, Kaliski Jr. 1996]
- Based on bit-serial multiplier
 - Multiplicand \times n-bit [Großschädl 2001]

Final reduction for prime field p

- $XYR^{-1} \bmod p$
- $T = (T + x_i Y + mp)/2 < 2p$

Input: k -bit integers X, Y with $0 \leq X, Y < p$, $R = 2^k$.

Output: $XYR^{-1} \bmod p$.

1: $T = (t_k, \dots, t_0)_2 \leftarrow 0$

2: **for** i from 0 to $k-1$ **do**

3: $m \leftarrow t_0 \oplus x_i \cdot y_0$

4: $T \leftarrow (T + x_i Y + mp)/2$

5: **end for**

6: **if** $T \geq p$ **then**

7: $T \leftarrow T - p$

8: **end if**

9: **return** T

Final Reduction
(Unnecessary for Binary fields)

Final reduction: $T = T - p < p$


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Ripple Carry Adder (RCA)

- Long carry chain
 - $s_i = x_i \oplus y_i \oplus z_i$
 - $c_{i+1} = \text{MAJ}(x_i, y_i, z_i)$
 $= (x_i \wedge y_i) \vee (y_i \wedge z_i) \vee (z_i \wedge x_i)$




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Carry Save Adder (CSA)

- 3-to-2 compression
 - $X + Y + Z = 2VC + VS$




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4-2 CSA

- Two FAs w/o carry chain
 - $X + Y + Z + W = 2VC + VS$




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Adder Tree

- 16 operands
- Latency ~ 5 or 6 FAs (RCA = 16FAs)




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Carry Lookahead Adder (CLA)

- Generate and Propagate
 - $g_i = x_i \wedge y_i$, $p_i = x_i \oplus y_i$



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Bit-serial Montgomery MM


Bit-serial Montgomery Modular Multiplication

Input: integers $n = (n_{k-1}, \dots, 1)_2$, $X = (x_{k-1}, \dots, x_0)_2$, $Y = (y_{k-1}, \dots, y_0)_2$ with $0 \leq X, Y < n$.

Output: $XYR^{-1} \bmod n$.

- $T_0 \leftarrow 0$
- for** i from 0 to $k-1$ **do**
- $q_i \leftarrow t_0 \oplus (x_0 \wedge y_i)$
- $T \leftarrow (T + q_i n + y_i X)/2$
- end for**
- if** $T \geq n$ **then**
- $T \leftarrow T - n$
- end if**
- return** T

4-2 CSA!




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Modular Reduction from LSB

- LSB-first bit-serial multiplier (binary fields)



Montgomery Multiplier:
 $A(x)B(x)R^{-1} \bmod P(x)$ ($R = x^k$)

- Delay is determined by d
- Loop : k/d


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Modular Reduction from MSB

- MSB-first bit-serial multiplier (binary field)



Final reduction for prime field p

- $XYR^{-1} \bmod p$
- $T = (T + x_i Y + mp)/2 < 2p$

Input: k -bit integers X, Y with $0 \leq X, Y < p$, $R = 2^k$.
Output: $XYR^{-1} \bmod p$.

```

1:  $T = (t_k, \dots, t_0)_2 \leftarrow 0$ 
2: for  $i$  from 0 to  $k-1$  do
3:    $m \leftarrow t_0 \oplus x_i \cdot y_0$ 
4:    $T \leftarrow (T + x_i Y + mp)/2$ 
5: end for
6: if  $T \geq p$  then
7:    $T \leftarrow T - p$ 
8: end if
9: return  $T$ 

```

Final Reduction

Final reduction: $T = T - p < p$

Towards no final reduction

- $XYR^{-1} \bmod p$
- $T = (T + x_i Y + mp)/2 < 3p$

Input: $(k+1)$ -bit integers, X, Y with $0 \leq X, Y < 2p$, $R = 2^{k+2}$.

Output: $XYR^{-1} \bmod p$.

```

1:  $T = (t_{k+1}, \dots, t_0)_2 \leftarrow 0$ 
2: for  $i$  from 0 to  $k$  do
3:    $m \leftarrow t_0 \oplus x_i \cdot y_0$ 
4:    $T \leftarrow (T + x_i Y + mp)/2$ 
5: end for
6:  $T \leftarrow (T + mp)/2$ 
7: return  $T$ 


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Loop + 1

$T = (T + mp)/2 < 2p$

Modular Reduction from LSB


- LSB-first bit-serial multiplier (prime field)



Montgomery Multiplier:
 $XYR^{-1} \bmod p$ ($R = 2^{k+2}$)

- Delay is determined by d
- Loop: $(k+2)/d$

- MSB-first bit-serial multiplier (prime field)



- $XY \bmod p$
- Intermediate value, $T = (2T + x_i Y) < 3p$

Input: k -bit integers X, Y with $0 \leq X, Y < p$.
Output: $XY \bmod p$.
 1: $T = (t_{k+1}, \dots, t_0)_2 \leftarrow 0$
 2: **for** i from $k-1$ to 0 **do**
 3: $T \leftarrow (2T + x_i Y)$
 4: $q \leftarrow \lfloor T/p \rfloor$
 5: $T \leftarrow (T - qp)$
 6: **end for**
 7: **return** T

- Division is escaped with precomputation

[Knezevic, Vercauteren, Verbaauwhede, 2010]

- $T/p = T/2^{k-1} * 2^{k-1}/p$
- S4 : $q = T/2^{k-1}$ shift operation (wiring)
- S5 : $T = (T - q * 2^{k-1}/p)$ precomputation

Input: k -bit integers X, Y with $0 \leq X, Y < p$.
Output: $XY \bmod p$.
 1: $T = (t_{k+1}, \dots, t_0)_2 \leftarrow 0$
 2: **for** i from $k-1$ to 0 **do**
 3: $T \leftarrow (2T + x_i Y)$
 4: $q \leftarrow \lfloor T/p \rfloor$
 5: $T \leftarrow (T - qp)$
 6: **end for**
 7: **return** T

- But $q = 0, 1, 2 \dots$

- Both MSB/LSB Modular Multiplication
[Batina et. al., 2004; Kaihara and Takagi, 2005]

- Combine MSB-first and LSB-first MM


$$\begin{aligned} & A(x)B(x)R^{-1} \bmod P(x) \\ &= (A_1(x)R + A_0)B(x)R^{-1} \bmod P(x) \\ &= A_1(x)B(x) \bmod P(x) \quad \text{MSB-first} \\ &\quad + A_0(x)B(x)R^{-1} \bmod P(x) \quad \text{LSB-first} \end{aligned}$$

- $R = x^{k/2}$

Bipartite Modular Multiplication



- Bipartite bit-serial multiplier (binary field)



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Merits in Bipartite Modular Multiplication



- Parallelism in Modular Multiplication
- Applicable to prime field (original proposal)
 - Need to take care (final) reductions
- Almost double performance, less than double area (F/Fs are shared)

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Fast Multiplier



- Booth recoding (radix-4)
 - Partial products x_iY
 - Escape $3Y$ nor $-3Y$
 - Half # of operands (at worst)
 - CSA + CLA

x_{2i+1}	x_{2i}	x_{2i-1}	z_i
0	0	0	0
0	0	1	1
0	1	0	1
0	1	1	2
1	0	0	-2 ($= \bar{2}$)
1	0	1	-1 ($= \bar{1}$)
1	1	0	-1 ($= \bar{1}$)
1	1	1	0

- Also derived by $2X - X (=X)$

Ex) $X = (00 \ 1111 \ 0011 \ 1001)_2 = (10\bar{1} \ 10\bar{2}1)_4$

$2X =$	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
$-X =$			0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
$Z =$			1	0		$\bar{1}$	1	0		$\bar{2}$		1			

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Multiplier-Based MMM



Multiplier-Based Montgomery Modular Multiplication

Input: integers $n = (n_{r-1}, \dots, n_0)_{2^m}$, $X = (x_{r-1}, \dots, x_0)_{2^m}$, $Y = (y_{r-1}, \dots, y_0)_{2^m}$ with $m = \lceil k/r \rceil$, $0 \leq X, Y < n$, $\gcd(n_0, 2) = 1$.

Output: $XYR^{-1} \bmod n$, $RR^{-1} - nn' = 1$, $R = 2^k$, $0 < R^{-1} < n$, $0 < n' < R$.

1: $T \leftarrow 0$

2: **for** i from 0 to $m-1$ **do**

3: $q_i \leftarrow (T + x_0 y_i) n' \bmod 2^k$

4: $T \leftarrow (T + q_i n + y_i X) / 2^k$ **Multiplications**

5: **end for**

6: **if** $T < n$ **then**

7: $T \leftarrow T - n$

8: **end if**

9: **Return** T

$X = (\text{f3 d7 2f 88}), Y = (\text{f6 c6 ba 98}), n = (\text{f9 81 89 2b})$

i	q_i	T	\leftarrow	$T + q_i n + y_i X$
Initial	—	(00 00 00 00 00)		
0	c0	(01 3e 3a ba 01)	\leftarrow	(01 3e 3a ba 01 00)
1	c5	(00 ee 8d 65 8a)	\leftarrow	(00 ee 8d 65 8a 00)
2	6a	(01 37 7f 16 e7)	\leftarrow	(01 37 7f 16 e7 00)
3	f3	(01 d8 4c 17 69)	\leftarrow	(01 d8 4c 17 69 00)
—	—	(00 de ca 8e 3e)		—

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
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Architecture for ECC coprocessor

- HW/SW co-design
 - CPU + coprocessor for ECC
- Speed performance depends on architecture
 - Trade-off between cost and performance
 - Local dedicated memory for high performance
- Instruction-set extension, ASIC, etc.


ECC coprocessor (I)

TYPE I: Smallest implementation (baseline)




ECC coprocessor (II)

TYPE II: TYPE I + m-coded RAM




ECC coprocessor (III)

TYPE III: TYPE I + CPRAM



TYPE IV: TYPE I + CPRAM & m-code RAM




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- Performance for HECC over $GF(2^{83})$
 - The number of cycles is reduced by CPRAM
 - Micro-coded RAM can avoid instruction stalls



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
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Cost, Performance and Security Trade-offs

□ Programmable VS hardwired parameters

- Curve parameters
- Computational sequence: Coordinates, operation form.
- Prime p , irreducible polynomial $P(x)$
- Field sizes



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
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Cost, Performance and Security Trade-offs

□ Programmable VS hardwired parameters

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
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□ Programmable VS hardwired parameters

- Curve parameters
- Computational sequence: Coordinates, operation form.
- Prime p , irreducible polynomial $P(x)$
- Field sizes




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□ Programmable high-speed coprocessor

- ECC / HECC over $GF(2^m)$
- Six MALU cores (MALU)




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□ How many instructions executed in parallel?

- Operation form
 $AB + C$ and
 $A(B+C) + D$

- Check the data dependencies for ECC (and HECC)




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
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Low-power MALU for RFID tags

- Based on MALU
- Cost and performance for ECC and HECC
- Power estimation with 0.13-um CMOS library

Resource sharing

- Modular addition and multiplication use the same hardware (cell)





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Trade-offs in ECC hardware

- Parallel processing
- Operation forms: $AB + C$ or $A(B+D) + C$
- Cost, performance, security



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